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Abstract 
Taiwan has had a highly stable party system since democratization, with the Kuomintang and 
Democratic Progressive Party dominating elections. Although they have faced a number of 
challengers over the last three decades, the two mainstream parties have always managed to 
maintain their dominance. However, in early 2019, it looked as though an earthquake election 
was in the cards in the upcoming January 2020 national elections. The mainstream parties faced 
unprecedented challenges both from within their own parties and from rival smaller challenger 
parties. What makes 2020 so puzzling is that it would ultimately be a maintaining election, 
with little change in both the parliamentary and presidential results compared to four years 
earlier. This essay tries to explain why 2020 featured continuity rather than the expected change 
in the party system. This is done with reference to (1) the China factor, (2) shortcomings in the 
challengers’ campaigns, and (3) institutional factors.  
Keywords: China factor, elections, electoral systems, party system, political parties, primaries, 
Taiwan. 
____________________ 
Some elections bring change to a political system, while others are marked by continuity. The
former are described by political scientists as earthquake or critical elections. Critical elections 
are defined by Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris as “Those exceptional contests which produce 
abrupt, significant and durable realignments in the electorate with major consequences for the 
long-term party order.”1 We can contrast these contests with maintaining elections in which 
the party system status quo is largely left unchanged from the previous round of elections. Of 
course, most elections fall in between these two extremes of continuity and change. Taiwan’s 
2020 elections represent a case very close to the definition of a maintaining election, as not 
only did Tsai Ing-wen retain the presidency far more comfortably than any previous incumbent, 
but also there was only minimal change in the parliamentary seat share compared with four 
years earlier. What makes this election so puzzling is that at least for the first half of 2019 it 
appeared that an earthquake election looked far more likely.  
For over three decades, Taiwan has had a remarkably stable party system.2 Since the 
first democratic multiparty election in 1991, two mainstream parties have dominated every 
parliamentary and presidential contest. These are the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP). This makes Taiwan quite distinct from the majority of new 
democracies that went through democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which 
often have featured unstable party systems.  
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The mainstream parties in Taiwan have faced a variety of challengers since the 1990s, 
but always have managed to come through with their dominance intact. For instance, in the 
mid-1990s, the KMT was challenged by a splinter party, the New Party (NP). This party was 
mainly made up of politicians defecting from the KMT and it won about 13 percent of the votes 
and seats at its peak. However, by the late 1990s, the NP was in serious decline and, although 
the party still exists, it has long since ceased to be a threat to its parent party. A more severe 
threat to the KMT came in the form of its rebel presidential candidate, Soong Chu-yu, and the 
splinter People First Party (PFP) that he established in 2000. Although Soong did not win the 
presidential election in 2000, he came in second and his 36 percent of the vote far exceeded 
that of the official KMT candidate, Lien Chan. At its peak, the PFP occupied 20 percent of the 
parliamentary seats (2001–2004) and higher party identification levels than the KMT in both 
2001 and 2002. However, the PFP, like the NP, gradually weakened and many of its politicians 
rejoined the KMT in the runup to the 2008 elections.3  
The DPP also was challenged internally by rebels such as former party chair, Hsu Hsin-
liang, in the 2000 presidential election and by splinter parties in the late 1990s. However, 
dissenters posed far less of a threat to the DPP than to the KMT. In the case of both parties, 
they were able to cope with these insider challengers and splinter parties and eventually 
reintegrate most of these former defectors.  
Movement parties, political parties that emerged from Taiwan’s civil society, have also 
contested elections since the late 1980s.4 However, for most of the last three decades, the 
movement parties have struggled to be competitive compared to the splinter parties. The first 
significant success was not until 2014, when the Green Party Taiwan (GPT) won seats at the 
local level, followed in 2016 when the New Power Party (NPP) became the first movement 
party to win national seats.  
Many new democracies, especially ones with direct presidential elections, also have 
experienced political outsiders challenging mainstream parties. Such outsiders were able to win, 
or at least mount a challenge for power without the backing of established political parties, in 
South Korea and the Philippines. 5  Other political outsiders have managed to gain the 
nomination of mainstream parties and even take control of these parties. Such political 
outsiders often have relied on populist appeals. In contrast, almost all of Taiwan’s presidential 
candidates have been nominated with extensive track records as national and/or local 
executives, as well as having party and parliamentary experience. Even the two early 
independent campaigns that did not have any party backing were led by establishment figures 
who already had extensive party and government experience.6 In other words, presidential 
candidates in Taiwan have been party establishment figures and not political outsiders.7  
In summary, over the last three decades, Taiwan’s two leading parties have faced three 
kinds of challengers to their domination of the party system: splinters, rebels, and movement 
parties. And while at times their domination has appeared to be under threat, they always have 
managed to overcome these challenges.  
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Challengers to Mainstream Parties in 2020 
 
This essay addresses challengers to the mainstream parties in the 2020 election. The 2020 
election is especially interesting in that the mainstream parties faced unprecedented challenges, 
yet, in the end, still managed to maintain their dominance in the party system. These challengers 
included both those originating from within the mainstream parties and those of splinter, 
movement, and populist parties. The goal of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the substance 
of the challenges that the mainstream parties faced. Second, it assesses some of the potential 
explanations for the resilience of the mainstream parties in the face of these challenges. To 
what extent can past experience help us understand the patterns seen in 2020? Naturally, 
different variables will be more important for understanding various types of challenges to 
mainstream parties. The essay structures the analysis of why 2020 eventually saw continuity 
in the party system through the lenses of the China factor, shortcomings in the challengers’ 
campaigns, and institutional factors.  
The first set of challenges to be addressed is internal challengers. In the case of the DPP, 
one arose during the presidential primary in which the incumbent president, Tsai Ing-wen, was 
challenged by her former premier, Lai Ching-te. This was the first time that the formal 
nomination of an incumbent president had been challenged since 1996. Moreover, in that case, 
the KMT had not allowed a competitive nomination process and instead Lee Teng-hui’s KMT 
rival, Lin Yang-kang, ran a rebel presidential campaign with the backing of the NP. When Lai 
initially announced his candidacy in early 2019, polls suggested that he had greater support 
than Tsai.8 However, by the time the primary was held in early June 2019, Tsai was able to win 
by a margin of 8 percent.9 Moreover, the DPP primary did not end in a serious party split and 
Lai eventually agreed to serve as Tsai’s vice presidential candidate.  
The KMT also held a primary and this could be described as its first competitive 
primary for presidential nomination. In the past, both parties had nominated presidential 
candidates who were well prepared for the post, with extensive national or local government 
experience. However, in 2020, the KMT’s nomination process produced a candidate who 
appeared largely unqualified for the role. There were three leading candidates in the KMT 
primary. The establishment candidate was Eric Chu, who had been the KMT’s losing 
presidential candidate in 2016. Chu had extensive local executive experience, and had been a 
legislator, university professor, KMT chair, and vice premier. The first challenger was the CEO 
of Foxconn, Terry Gou. Although he had built his company to become the largest employer in 
Taiwan, he had no previous political experience. The third serious candidate was former 
legislator, Han Kuo-yu. Although he was less of an outsider than Gou, he had no central 
government experience and had been in the political wilderness for much of the previous two 
decades since leaving parliament in 2001. However, Han had shocked political analysists by 
his surprise success in winning the Kaohsiung mayoral election in November 2018. This was 
the first time the KMT had won control of Taiwan’s second largest city since 1998. Thus, by 
the time Han announced that he was joining the KMT presidential primary, he had gained local 
executive experience for only a few months.  
Although there were five candidates for the KMT presidential primary, it was 
essentially a battle between the semi-outsider Han and the outsider Gou. When the results were 
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announced in July 2019, it was clear that Han had won comfortably with 44.8 percent of the 
vote, followed by Gou’s 27.7 percent. The best qualified establishment candidate, Eric Chu, 
managed only a 17.9 percent support rate. In other words, the KMT’s nomination process had 
allowed a challenger, who could be termed a semi-outsider, to be its presidential candidate. It 
is noteworthy, though, that despite the heated competition for presidential nomination in both 
leading parties, rebel candidates did not emerge among the unsuccessful candidates.  
Therefore, the first puzzle to be addressed is why did the two parties’ nomination 
processes have such different outcomes. In the DPP’s case, the incumbent not only survived a 
primary challenge but also the party emerged strengthened and more united. In contrast, the 
KMT nomination process saw the establishment candidate roundly defeated by a populist 
candidate who had long been outside the party. Not only did he win the primary but also he 
appeared to have taken over the party.  
In the majority of polls in the first half of 2019, Han’s support rates were well above 
Tsai’s. For instance, a poll in February gave Han 37 percent of voter support to only 16 percent 
for Tsai.10 Nevertheless, in mid-August, Tsai took the lead in the polls and saw this lead 
gradually expand during the campaign, so that by the end of December Tsai had a 16-point 
lead over Han (45 percent to 29 percent).11 In the actual election, Tsai not only increased her 
vote share but also her vote total compared to 2016. Although Han narrowed the margin of 
Tsai’s victory, she still won by almost 20 percent.  
In addition to Han, there were other potential threats to Tsai’s presidential re-election. 
The person with the most potential to undermine the DPP’s campaign was the independent 
Taipei mayor, Ko Wen-je. In most polls in the first half of 2019, Ko’s support rates were higher 
than Tsai’s, and it appeared that his candidacy would be more damaging to the DPP than to the 
KMT. However, Ko’s support appeared to decline in the summer of 2019 and he belatedly 
announced that he would not stand for election in September.12 A further potential challenger 
was the PFP chair, Soong, who had almost won as a KMT rebel in 2000 and in 2016 had won 
almost 13 percent of the vote. Although Soong has tried to sell his party as an alternative to 
Blue-Green politics, in 2016, his candidacy was more damaging to the KMT campaign. In 2020, 
Soong’s campaign did not take off and ultimately his vote share was only 4.26 percent, well 
below the 7– 8 percent he had received in pre-election polls.  
Therefore, the second puzzle is why did Tsai’s two main presidential challengers go 
from leading in the polls to seeing their campaigns fall apart? In Ko’s case, this led him to 
decide not to stand for election, while Han went from being the supposed savior of the KMT 
to becoming a liability.  
When it comes to the parliamentary election, change also had appered in the cards in 
the first half of 2019. It seemed unlikely that the DPP would hold onto its parliamentary 
majority. The KMT had been boosted by its local executive and council election victories in 
November 2018. Similarly, the movement parties that had evolved from the progressive side 
of Taiwan’s civil society posed an even greater threat to the DPP than four years earlier. The 
NPP had ended its semi-alliance with the DPP from 2016 and also had performed well in the 
2018 local council elections. 
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Lastly, although Ko eventually chose not to contest the presidency, his newly created 
Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) represented the most significant challenge to the two mainstream 
parties since the height of the PFP in 2001–2002.13 Moreover, polls suggested that the TPP 
posed more of a threat to the DPP in the single member district constituencies. Both the DPP 
and KMT also faced splinter parties, but as has long been the case, the splinter challenge was 
greater for the KMT than for the DPP. For instance, not only did the KMT face competition on 
the party list from the NP and the PFP, but also the PFP had a presidential candidate again. 
In the end, however, the parliamentary results showed an unprecedented level of 
continuity. The balance between DPP and KMT seats was almost unchanged, with the DPP 
falling from sixty-eight to sixty-one seats and the KMT rising from thirty-five to thirty-eight 
seats. Instead, the biggest changes occurred on the margins of the party system, as the PFP lost 
its parliamentary representation and the TPP became the third largest party with five seats. 
Despite increasing its party list vote share, the NPP fell from five to three seats. Similarly, 
although the other two relevant movement-based parties, the GPT and the State Building Party 
(SBP), ran well-funded campaigns, they both failed to cross the 5 percent threshold needed for 
party list seats.14 Although the total progressive movement party vote share and number of 
relevant parties increased, their number of seats was almost the same, falling from five in 2016 
to four in 2020. Ultimately, the splinter parties were severely weakened and, for the first time 
since 1992, none of their candidates was elected to Taiwan’s parliament.15  
Therefore, the third puzzle concerns why we also witnessed a maintaining election in 
Taiwan’s parliamentary party system. The local elections in 2018 had suggested there would 
be a similar earthquake at the national level in 2020, but the outcome was one of continuity. 
 
The China Factor 
 
Taiwan’s election results are often oversimplified in both media and some academic accounts 
through the lens of the China factor. In other words, elections are understood as a referendum 
on Taiwan’s relations with China or on unification versus independence. In their book The 
Taiwan Voter, Christopher Achen and TY Wang conclude, “The central finding is that one key 
dimension organizes Taiwan citizens’ vote choices—the China factor.”16 But what exactly is 
the China factor and how should its impact on elections in Taiwan be best understood? Wu 
Jieh-min defined the China factor as “the process by which the PRC government utilizes capital 
and related resources to absorb other countries and ‘offshore districts’ (jingwai diqu, such as 
Hong Kong) into its sphere of economic influence, thereby making them economically 
dependent on China in order to further facilitate its political influence.”17 For the purpose of 
this essay, the China factor is considered more broadly to include the impact of developments 
and actors in the PRC on Taiwan’s party and electoral politics. In other words, this can also 
include nongovernment actors in the PRC, such as Taishang, as well as developments in Hong 
Kong.  
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The way that the China factor affects Taiwan’s elections is complex and changes over 
time. For example, there are some years when the China factor appears to have been less salient 
and instead the campaign has been dominated by domestic issues, such as in 2008 or even 2016. 
There are also years when the issue appears to favor the KMT and to be detrimental to the DPP, 
such as 1996 or 2012. There are other years when the China factor seems to have enhanced the 
electoral prospects of the DPP, such as 2000, or as we will see in this study, 2020. The way the 
issue works on Taiwan’s public opinion is affected by both what China says and does and the 
ways in which Taiwan’s parties respond. As Kharis Templeman notes, “In Taiwan, Beijing’s 
preferred candidates have tended to do best when Beijing does least—threats and overt 
endorsements have usually served only to strengthen PRC-sceptical voices over friendlier 
ones.”18 
The first place where we can see the effect of the China factor in the puzzles addressed 
in this essay concerns the DPP’s presidential nomination. In late 2018, polls suggested that Lai 
Ching-te would be a stronger presidential candidate than Tsai.19 One reason that there was 
strong potential for the China factor to be especially influential on the primary was that many 
of Tsai’s loudest critics were from the older generation of the Pan Green camp who believed 
that she had been too cautious in promoting Taiwan’s independence. In contrast, they saw Lai 
as a better representative of their cause.20 
Both Shelley Rigger and Templeman view Xi Jinping’s January 2, 2019 speech on 
Taiwan as the starting point of Tsai’s recovery.21 Xi reiterated the PRC position that peaceful 
unification under “One Country, Two Systems,” the model used in Hong Kong for the 
handover from Britain to China in 1997, was the only possible future for cross-Strait relations. 
This Chinese linkage of the “One China” principle with “One Country, Two Systems” placed 
the KMT in a difficult position, as it was harder for it to sell its “One China, Different 
Interpretations”22  model for cross-Strait relations to the Taiwanese electorate. Templeman 
notes how Tsai’s forceful rejection of Xi’s speech was well received in the polls and even 
gained cross-party support.23 
As the DPP’s primary campaign developed, Tsai was able to narrow the gap over Lai 
and take the lead. Brian Hioe argued that both Xi’s January military threats against Taiwan if 
it rejected China’s unification proposals and the anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong 
contributed to Tsai’s victory in the primary. It is noteworthy that, despite Lai’s reputation for 
being a strong supporter of Taiwan’s independence, he did not benefit from the China factor in 
the same way as Tsai. Hioe noted, for instance, how Lai did not make a serious attempt to 
distinguish his outlook toward China or his broad policy appeal from Tsai’s in the primary 
debate. In fact, perhaps in order to appeal to the floating voters he needed to win the primary 
poll, he disappointed hardliners by reiterating the moderate DPP position that there was no 
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need for Taiwan to declare independence because Taiwan already was an independent 
country.24 
The continuation of protests in Hong Kong and violent police actions, together with the 
perception of a growing PRC threat to Taiwan, undermined the campaigns of both Taipei 
mayor, Ko Wen-je, and the KMT’s Han Kuo-yu. Ko had been ahead of Tsai in the polls for 
much of the first half of 2019, but as Tsai’s support levels recovered, Ko’s campaign began to 
falter. Since Ko had been willing to reach out to China with the slogan, “One family on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait,” he had lost the backing of many former supporters.25 Instead, it 
appeared he was now reaching out to Pan Blue voters rather than the Sunflower generation that 
had been central to his rise to power in 2014. Ko’s changed approach toward China also 
contributed to the DPP’s decision to no longer support him in his 2018 re-election bid. The fact 
that Ko only narrowly won re-election as Taipei City Mayor suggests his support already was 
on the wane. While Ko’s ambiguous positions concerning China allowed his election as 
Taipei’s mayor, his perspectives regarding China could not be avoided in a national election, 
especially when China was so prominent on the political agenda. Although Ko did not officially 
announce that he would not run until September, he had been losing support gradually in the 
first half of 2019 and it could be argued he had switched his focus by July to his new party, the 
TPP.26 
Although Han tried to project a very different image from that of the previous KMT 
president, Ma Ying-jeou, in reality his China policies were almost identical to Ma’s. In other 
words, for Han and Ma, the China market represented the answer to Taiwan’s economic 
problems. Indeed, Han was happy to engage with China on the basis of the 1992 consensus that 
there was One China, albeit with two different interpretations. The way Han would deal with 
China was made clear in his visit to Hong Kong as the mayor of Kaohsiung in March 2019. 
The official stated objective of the trip was to boost the market for Kaohsiung’s agricultural 
products. In Hong Kong, Han met both Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam and China’s 
top official in Hong Kong, the Director of the PRC’s Hong Kong Liaison Office, Wang Zhimin. 
Then, in Xiamen, Han met the head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), Liu Jieyi. The 
DPP questioned whether Han was offering tacit support for “One Country, Two Systems.” For 
instance, the director of the Mainland Affairs Council, Chen Ming-tung, called Han’s visit a 
“political act that falls under the One Country, Two Systems framework.”27 However, Han 
appeared to be following a precedent established in 2005 when KMT chair Lien Chan visited 
China at a time in which China was refusing to deal with the elected DPP government. It 
seemed that Han was preparing a blueprint to return to Ma-era cross-Strait relations, the model 
that had been rejected by the Sunflower Movement in 2014. At least at this point, though, it 
did not yet appear that there was a major public backlash against Han’s China initiatives.  
The 2019 anti-extradition Hong Kong protests changed the Taiwanese political agenda 
to a much greater extent than their predecessor, the 2014 Umbrella Movement. Han’s earlier 
Hong Kong visit placed him in a very awkward position when the protests first erupted. As 
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Templeman explained, “A revealing moment came at the very outset of the Hong Kong protests 
on June 9, when Han feigned ignorance, then dismissed them as a ‘parade.’ He backtracked 
under a deluge of criticism—later that month, he would vow that OC2S would take effect in 
Taiwan only ‘over my dead body’—but the damage had been done.”28 If the protests had 
quickly faded, probably the effect on Han’s campaign could have been contained. However, 
they continued, and images of violent police and gangster action against the protestors made 
the government’s handling of the demonstrations impossible to ignore.  
In addition to the Hong Kong protests, other China-related issues filled the news media 
in the second half of 2019. The KMT’s attempts to shift the agenda away from concerns about 
China or to sell its vision of cross-Strait relations became impossible. China continued to apply 
both economic and military pressures. For instance, Templeman notes, “On 31 March 2019 
there was an apparently deliberate incursion by PRC fighter jets across the midline of the 
Taiwan Strait—the first such incident in two decades.”29 Similarly, China attempted to punish 
Taiwan economically by reducing the number of Chinese tour groups and banning travel by 
independent Chinese tourists to Taiwan. International media organizations such as Reuters and 
the Financial Times reported on how China was trying to control Taiwan’s media landscape 
and agenda both through the Want Want media group and by “secretly paying to place positive 
stories about the mainland in Taiwanese papers.”30 The perception that the PRC was trying to 
influence Taiwan’s elections and support the KMT was further reinforced by the news story 
that broke in November 2019 of the defection of an alleged Chinese spy in Australia and his 
reports on how he had operated in Taiwan.  
A useful framework for understanding how topics operate in elections is issue 
ownership theory.31 Stated simply, voters view some parties as better able than others to deal 
with certain matters, thus they can be seen as owning these issues. To reap electoral benefits, 
the key for parties is to make certain that the focus of the political agenda is on their owned 
issues. In contrast, parties will try to steer the political agenda away from topics that are owned 
by their opponents.  
In 2012, the KMT had appeared to own the cross-Strait issue. Consequently, in debates 
and advertising, it tried to challenge the DPP on relations with China, while the DPP tried to 
steer the political agenda toward more favorable social considerations.32 In contrast, the pattern 
was reversed in 2020. As Templeman explained, “Han’s campaign strategy was to deflect 
concerns about the China threat by talking about the economy and Taiwan’s diplomatic 
isolation. This approach faltered as rumours of CCP interference in the race grew louder.”33 
The pattern of issue ownership also was seen in the way the parties addressed the Hong Kong 
protests. A forthcoming study by Eva Mazzeo compares the way that Han and Tsai dealt with 
the Hong Kong protests in their social media posts.34 She found not only that Tsai had far more 
posts mentioning the Hong Kong protests, but also that her posts were much more extensive. 
In contrast, Han talked far less on Facebook posts about Hong Kong. In Mazzeo’s words, 
“Han’s comments on the protests in Hong Kong are few and chaotic, and the real intention of 
his discourse is difficult to identify.”35 
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An example of Tsai’s employment in the campaign of China’s crackdown in Hong 
Kong was her January 6, 2020 TV ad, Speak Loudly (大聲說話). 36 The ad starts with everyday 
scenes of young people’s lives, then the narrator describes how just a few hundred kilometres 
away countless young people are disappearing, being imprisoned, and being abused on a daily 
basis. Then Xi’s January 2 speech is referenced with the line, “It turns out the 1992 consensus 
is One Country Two Systems. It turns out that One Country Two Systems is dictatorship.” Next, 
the visuals switch from carefree young peoples’ lives in Taiwan to clips from Hong Kong and 
China that cast the KMT in a negative light. First is Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam, 
whom Han had met in March, followed by the China-based Taiwanese singer, Huang An, who 
created a media storm in 2016 by denouncing the teenage K-pop idol, Chou Tzu-yu, as a 
Taiwan independence supporter for waving an ROC flag. This is followed by clips of three 
KMT nominated legislators, Wu Szu-huai, Chiu Yi, and Yeh Yu-lan, who have reputations for 
being pro-PRC. Wu had been attacked during the campaign for a film of him standing for the 
PRC national anthem at an event in Beijing. Both Chiu and Yeh had formerly been nominated 
by the pro-unification New Party, suggesting that the KMT was also pro-unification. Moreover, 
Yeh was one of the few politicians in Taiwan who had publicly supported the actions of the 
Hong Kong police against the protesters. This is followed by a clip of Xi and finally by a 
slightly longer visual of violent police actions against protestors in Hong Kong.  
The DPP’s framing of the China threat appears to have been especially effective in 
winning back the support of young voters who tend to have the highest level of Taiwanese 
identity. Comparing the support rates of the 20–29 age group in a July 2019 survey with the 
final pre-election survey of December 29 reveals the effect of the campaign. In the first survey, 
the support rates for the group were 45 percent for Ko Wen-je, 34 percent for Tsai, and 20 
percent for Han, but by December the rates were 63 percent for Tsai and only 24 percent for 
Han.37  
Templeman has observed that the PRC’s interference “efforts seem to have worked 
against Beijing’s ‘defeat Tsai’ project: Within a year, she went from probable loser to 18-point 
winner.”38 It can be argued that it is also important to factor in the way both the Han and Tsai 
campaigns reacted to the impact of China on Taiwan. As Mazzeo concludes in her study of the 
way candidates dealt with the Hong Kong protests in their social media posts, “the President 
of Taiwan was able to be re-elected not only due to the context she had been presented with, 
but also for the way in which she was capable of exploiting it. In other words, if her narrative 
had not taken Hong Kong into account, the results of the election would have likely been 
different.”39 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Tsai did not adopt an extreme anti-China stance. 
A number of studies observe that Taiwanese voters have tended to reject the DPP when it has 
adopted exclusive ethnic nationalist campaign appeals .40 While in 2016 the DPP left such 
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exclusive appeals to the Taiwan Solidarity Union, in 2020 the State Building Party played this 
role. 
 
Shortcomings in the Challengers’ Campaigns 
 
Although the China factor, especially the Hong Kong protests, played a key role in explaining 
the election outcome, it does not tell us the whole story. It is important to remember that the 
key challengers to the Taiwanese party system in 2020 had risen to power locally on platforms 
and appeals that were not centered on China. Hsiao, for instance, views Ko, Han, and Gou as 
part of what he calls a trend in “Rising Populism in Taiwan Politics.”41 For Hsiao, there are 
three core features of global populism today: 
 
1) a right-wing nationalistic xenophobic and racist/anti-immigration 
conservative ideology, 2) a form of charismatic leadership with politicized 
mobilization of the masses, and 3) a style of rhetoric reflecting absolute 
principle that ‘the people’—especially ‘the common people’ and not the elites— 
should rule all aspects of politics.42 
 
Moreover, he argues that all three types were present in the Taiwan case in 2019.  
Even though there are aspects about the style of campaigning adopted by Ko and Han 
that fit standard definitions of “populism,” the present analysis is not centered on the concept. 
One problem is the way the term is used in Taiwan. Generally, it is used to condemn opponents 
without any reference to or understanding of the academic definitions. Secondly, by trying to 
squeeze the challenger cases into a set definition of populism, it is easy to lose track of the 
objective of this essay, which is to shed light on why the 2020 campaign was ultimately a 
maintaining election. It is easy to frame 2020 as a case of Taiwan’s rejection of populism, but 
this tells only part of the story.  
Therefore, this section of the essay addresses the non-China related elements of the 
challengers’ campaigns and how these contributed to the candidates’ electoral performance. Of 
interest is why the electoral strategies that got them elected in the first place and allowed them 
to gain significant levels of support in the first half of 2019, seemed to cease to be effective in 
the second half of the year. Since young voters had been a key factor in the initial success of 
Han in 2018 and Ko in 2014, it is especially interesting to consider the non-China-related 
factors in why their youth support bases either declined or collapsed.  
Both Ko and Han had managed to be elected in locations long seen as strongholds for 
their rival parties. This had led to downplaying partisan identity in their campaigns. In Han’s 
2018 newspaper ads, he never mentioned that he was a KMT candidate and there was no KMT 
party insignia. Despite being a KMT candidate, he even could use the slogan, “Taiwan can no 
longer divide between Blues and Greens.”43 He tried to argue that politics were the problem 
not the solution and indicated that he would focus all of his attention on economics if elected. 
His most repeated slogan during the campaign was, “Export the products, people come in. 
Kaohsiung make a fortune.”44 Therefore, a key element of his 2018 campaign was that once it 
was possible to export the city’s products, Kaohsiung would be able to provide economic 
opportunities that would motivate people to move to the city. A symbol of this export appeal 
was his adoption of a cabbage as his 2018 campaign logo, symbolizing how Kaohsiung would 
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become rich through exporting its agricultural products.45 In fact, many of Han’s ads focused 
on the idea that, because of the poor state of Kaohsiung’s economy, the city’s young residents 
were forced to seek employment in the north of Taiwan. Many of Han’s front-page newspaper 
ads featured images of homesick youngsters in Taipei, with slogans such as “Father, Mother, I 
want to come home.”46  
One element of Han’s campaign that neatly fit the populist label was his attempt to 
portray himself as a nonelite politician. Accordingly, one of his core slogans was that he would 
be a “president of the common people.” He often employed the picture of a bottle of mineral 
water to suggest his modest and frugal nature.47 He claimed that he had a severe lack of 
resources compared to his DPP rivals, though, in reality, in 2018 he outspent his opponent in 
campaign advertising. Han was willing to attack the failures of the Taiwanese government 
since Chiang Ching-kuo leadership, including the administrations of both KMT and DPP 
presidents. Nathan Batto highlighted a speech Han made in 2017 in his bid for the KMT chair 
in which he argued, 
 
There are now three living ex-presidents, President Lee, President Chen and 
President Ma. You were president for over twenty years. What industry did you 
leave behind for Taiwan? The only industry Taiwan has is in the Hsinchu 
Science Park. We don’t have a second sector. Too tragic. You were president. 
You feasted and feasted. If it wasn’t engaging in corruption it was laziness or 
goofing off.48 
 
In Han’s campaign speeches and the televised presidential policy presentations, he 
repeatedly accused Tsai and her DPP administration of being corrupt.49 Batto highlighted a 
Han campaign speech which gives a sense of the way he framed his corruption message: 
 
It’s full of corruption and rot. They feast and feast. The factions divide the spoils 
among themselves. When the factions finish dividing the spoils, their underlings 
divide up their share, and then their lackeys take their cut. As long as you are a 
DPP elite, it doesn’t matter what birth status or background you have, as long 
as you are one of their people. It doesn’t matter if you have murdered someone, 
committed arson, or embezzled money, it doesn’t matter. They’ll give you a 
powerful position all the same. They set these people free on us to engage in 
corruption, to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Taiwanese people. Now, 
after three and a half years, all of Taiwan is sick.50 
 
Both Ko and Han were able to rely on the support of mainstream parties plus a 
significant number of floating voters to accomplish their initial surprise electoral successes. 
However, both would experience an erosion in his support base that would cause Ko to decide 
not to stand for election and Han to eventually lose by a wide margin. In the previous section, 
there was a discussion of the China impact on swings in support levels, but factors unrelated to 
China also contributed to these changes.  
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Since Ko’s support had risen earlier than Han’s, his decline in support was more gradual. 
It was already clear that Ko’s popularity was falling when he struggled to win re-election in 
2018. Naturally, his overtures to China had led the DPP and pro-independence groups to cease 
supporting him, but his rise was also closely tied to the emergence of the Sunflower Movement 
generation of youth activism. Even in 2016, Green Party Social Democratic Party Alliance 
candidates sought Ko’s endorsement. However, it has become increasingly unpalatable for the 
progressive movement parties to ally with Ko in recent years. As Brian Hioe has noted, “Ko 
has also caused controversy for misogynistic and sexist comments many times in recent 
memories, pointing to Ko’s own social conservatism.”51 Hioe also notes how the TPP was 
willing to nominate socially conservative candidates: “TPP candidate Hsieh Wen-ching (謝文
卿), who is running in Taipei City Constituency 5, is actively campaigning on a platform to 
repeal the Tsai administration’s legalization of gay marriage.” 52  Thus, during the 2020 
campaign, Ko instead became a target of attack by progressive movement parties such as the 
GPT.53 Additionally, by making overtures to Pan Blue figures such as James Soong, Wang 
Jinping, and Terry Gou, it was clear that Ko was moving further away from his original 2014 
base. Hioe concluded that Ko’s party, the TPP, “should not be mistaken for anything but a 
conservative Pan Blue party.”54 
Like Ko, Han had relied on a diverse alliance of support bases to win in 2018. He had 
managed to appeal to both the KMT base, as well as to those without a clear partisan affiliation 
and to people dissatisfied after two decades of DPP rule in Kaohsiung. By winning back the 
Kaohsiung mayoral post for the KMT, Han made many believe he could perform a similar 
miracle at the national level. However, by seeking the KMT’s nomination for the presidential 
campaign just months after being elected Kaohsiung’s mayor resulted in a sense of betrayal 
among many of his original nonpartisan supporters. Even during his first months in office, it 
appeared that he was struggling to live up to the expectations he had raised in his mayoral 
campaign. According to Batto, writing toward the end of the campaign: “Han has not 
performed well as mayor; he has not taken good care of the shumin” (common people).55 The 
campaign in Kaohsiung to recall him began in June 2019. This would eventually lead to Han’s 
being the highest profile politician to be successfully recalled in June 2020. He paid a large 
price for abandoning Kaohsiung. He went from winning the mayoral election in 2018 with 53.8 
percent of the vote, to the 2020 presidential election in which he managed to win only 34.6 
percent of the vote in Kaohsiung, well below his national vote share of 38.6 percent.  
For much of Taiwan’s post democratic transition era, political corruption has been an 
electoral issue that has favored the DPP, as the KMT has been viewed by voters as a highly 
corrupt  party.56 However, there have been elections in which issue ownership has switched. In 
2005 and 2008, KMT accusations of DPP corruption played a major role in the KMT’s 
landslide election victories. However, there also have been many election campaigns during 
which the KMT has made similar accusations against the DPP but they have not resonated with 
voters. Sometimes this has been because the accusations have not been seen as serious or 
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believable and on other occasions because voters simply have viewed the KMT as a more 
corrupt party than the DPP. For instance, in 2004, the KMT made corruption accusations 
against Chen Shui-bian’s wife during the presidential election but they did not appear to have 
any significant impact. Despite Han’s heavy emphasis on accusations of DPP corruption during 
the 2020 campaign, it appears that voters did not find these allegations especially convincing. 
There were some corruption scandals during Tsai’s first term, but they were not on the kind of 
scale nor directly linked to the ruling party as in many earlier presidencies. 
Lastly, Han’s slogan of being a common person president was undermined as new 
scandals emerged during the campaign. Batto and Hioe maintain that Han was damaged by the 
scandals related to his luxury real-estate transactions in Taipei and his wife’s construction of 
an illegal luxury mansion on agricultural-zoned land in Yunlin.57 Batto notes that, as a result 
of such scandals, “His opponents questioned whether a property speculator who depended on 
political connections was really a shumin or whether he was actually merely an ordinary 
corrupt politician.”58 In fact, the Yunlin county magistrate, Chang Li-san, being so often at 
Han’s side during campaign events was likely to undermine his credibility of being free of 
corruption. Chang is the sister of the former county magistrate, Chang Jung-wei, now serving 
an eight-year jail sentence for corruption and featured in Ko’s ground-breaking book on 
organized crime and politics, Heijin.59  
In short, as the campaign developed, non-China campaign factors contributed to the 
loss of much original support base for both Ko and Han. While Ko eventually opted to 
withdraw from the presidential campaign, Han was increasingly left with only the core Pan 




One of the most studied topics in political science is the effect that institutions can have on the 
evolution of the party system. This analysis of the 2020 campaign suggests two key ways in 
which Taiwan’s political institutions can help us to understand the eventual limited effect that 
the political challengers had on the political scene. This is examined first from the perspective 
of the parties’ nomination systems and second by looking at the actual electoral system.  
There has been much debate, both within political parties and academic circles, about 
the potential effects of different types of nomination systems in Taiwan. Much of this reflection 
has centered on the pros and cons of inclusive competitive primaries versus centralized, top-
down nomination. Although some Taiwanese politicians have warned of the damaging effect 
of inclusive nomination, in a study using cases mainly in the 1990s, Wu and Fell argued that 
“the weakening of party competitiveness cannot be blamed on primaries.”60 In a more recent 
publication, Fell concluded that the KMT’s adoption of more institutionalized primaries was a 
key factor in its electoral recovery in the post-2000 period through 2008.61  
In their nominations for the 2020 presidential race, both the KMT and the DPP adopted 
remarkably similar procedures for their candidate selection. Both relied primarily on national 
telephone polling for their presidential primaries and held primary debates; however, the 
outcomes were markedly different. In the KMT’s case, the semi-outsider and outsider 
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candidates performed best; in the DPP’s case, the incumbent managed to defeat her challenger. 
Therefore, it was the way in which the parties dealt with the aftermath of the nomination 
process that can tell us more about why 2020 was a maintaining election year.  
Since the introduction of multiparty elections, the KMT has tended to be much less 
comfortable with the competitivity of inclusive nomination. We can see this not only in its 
relatively late adoption and use of primaries but also in the way the losers have handled defeat. 
Historically, KMT candidates have been likely to stand as rebels after failing to gain party 
nomination, thus splitting the KMT vote and making the party appear divided. In the case of 
the 2020 KMT primary, second-place Terry Gou not only contested the fairness of the primary, 
but also withdrew from the party and initially did not rule out standing as an independent 
candidate. Although Gou eventually decided not to run as a KMT rebel, the KMT’s primary 
left the party looking divided and questions were raised about the degree to which the party 
establishment truly backed Han.  
The way in which the DPP’s primary was conducted was also controversial as not only 
was the polling date delayed repeatedly but also changes were made to the methodology of the 
polls so that cell phones were included in the primary survey.62 It was clear that the DPP 
leadership had tried to manipulate the primary to favor Tsai.  
The way the DPP handled the aftermath of the primary was in stark contrast to the KMT. 
Although Lai had initially questioned the legitimacy of some aspects of the primary, he 
accepted the eventual results and later agreed to serve as Tsai’s vice presidential candidate. In 
other words, the DPP was able to deal better with the competitive primary and to reunite the 
party afterward. This was something the DPP had managed well in the past. For instance, after 
the bitterly fought 2008 presidential primary, the DPP was able to heal wounds by nominating 
the second-place candidate, Su Tseng-chang, as the vice presidential candidate. Therefore, 
when comparing the two parties, it was not so much their actual nomination methods that 
contributed to the different outcomes; instead, what mattered was the unwritten rules of inner-
party political culture in handling party competition.  
When it comes to national elections, we can see the institutional effect most clearly on 
parliamentary election results. As mentioned at the outset of this essay, there was a remarkable 
degree of continuity in the parliamentary share of seats in 2020 compared with four years 
earlier. What makes this puzzling is that, in the party list vote, the KMT and the DPP vote 
shares were almost tied, with the DPP share declining from 44 percent in 2016 to 33.9 percent, 
while the KMT’s share rose from 27 percent to 33.3 percent. The other major shift in vote share 
was the significant increase gained by the relevant challenger parties, with the TPP’s 11.2 
percent particularly eye-catching.  
The electoral system that Taiwan adopted in 2005 can help explain the degree of 
continuity between the mainstream parties and the limited inroads the challenger parties made. 
Under this mixed majoritarian system, the ultimate control of parliament is determined in the 
competition for the seventy-three single-member districts. This part of the election has tended 
to be largely a competition between the two mainstream parties, the KMT and the DPP, while 
other parties have not been competitive. As the 2020 presidential election gradually swung in 
favor of Tsai, her support was able to boost the fortunes of the DPP parliamentary candidates. 
In contrast, Han’s weakening campaign negatively affected KMT district candidates. This 
presidential effect was reinforced by the fact that the presidential and parliamentary elections 
were held on the same day. Although the small parties, the TPP and the NPP, were stronger at 
the district level in 2020 compared to 2016, none of their candidates was competitive against 
the two mainstream parties. 
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Therefore, the smaller parties’ principal hope of getting candidates elected lay in the 
proportional party list competition, which accounts for only thirty-four seats. Despite voters’ 
growing willingness to split their district and part list votes, only eight seats were won by small 
parties on the party list, while the DPP and the KMT shared the remaining twenty-six seats. 
The TPP’s 11.2 percent party list vote share gave it only 4.4 percent of the total seats, while 
despite the NPP’s increase of its party list vote share from 6.1 to 7.7 percent, it fell from five 
to three seats. If Taiwan had a proportional representation system, the scope for challenger 




In short, this essay has examined how Taiwan’s mainstream parties coped with the challenges 
to their domination of the party system in the most recent national election in 2020. This 
includes both challengers coming from within the main parties and those from other challenger 
parties. The question posed at the outset of the essay was, despite the myriad of challenges 
facing the mainstream parties in the first half of 2019, how did the 2020 election achieve such 
a high degree of continuity? When an earthquake election had been the bookies’ favorite 
outcome, why did we instead witness a maintaining election?  
Although there is a wide range of ways to explain any election, this essay has focused 
on the China factor, shortcomings in the challengers’ campaigns, and institutional factors. 
Although the China factor was critical in the DPP’s ability to win re-election and maintain its 
parliamentary majority, it was not just the high salience of the issue that allowed Tsai to win 
back support. Equally important were the ways in which Tsai and her rivals addressed the 
China threat and the Hong Kong protests in their campaign communications. It can be said that, 
at least in 2020, Tsai and the DPP owned the China issue.  
Although the China factor was probably the most influential factor explaining Tsai’s 
recovery and eventual re-election, this essay shows that shortcomings in the challengers’ 
campaigns should not be ignored. Many of the core appeals that had allowed them to be elected 
at the local level gradually became ineffective during the 2020 campaign. Lastly, the essay has 
considered the institutional factors contributing to continuity in 2020. Despite using similar 
nomination systems, the two main parties selected entirely different types of candidates. 
Moreover, the DPP was much more successful at healing the primary wounds and reuniting 
the party for the national campaign. The parliamentary election system meant that the new 
challenger parties could be competitive only for the proportional party list seats. Since these 
account for only thirty-four seats, despite the rising popularity of the smaller parties, they were 
able to advance only minimal change to the overall party system. 
